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Does Cash Flow Really Matter for 
Corporate Investment Decisions? 
Long ago and far away…
 Long-observed relationship between corporate investment and cash 
flow: 
- Fisher (Econom., 1933); Gurley and Shaw (AER, 1955); Meyer and 
Kuh (1957).
 Prima-facie evidence of financing constraints.
 Motivated capital rationing literature (‘BODs’):
- Charnes et al. (JB, 1959); Baumol and Quandt (EJ, 1965);
Myers (JF  1972)  Weingartner (JF  1977), , , .
An economics-inspired takeover
 Modigliani-Miller insights and perfect/efficient markets paradigm lead 
to a sea change in thinking:
- A project’s ‘worth’ is determined solely by its NPV. Financing 
considerations, including the firm’s cash reserves, are irrelevant.
- All ‘good’ projects receive funding.
 Capital rationing discussions begin to be relegated to little more than 
a footnote in textbooks.
 What about the empirical relationship between investment and cash 
flow? ‘Explained’ as emanating either from:
- cash flow a proxy for profitability and investment opportunities; or
- agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, JFE 1976)  overinvestment!
The counter-revolution
 Corporate finance theory during the 1980s began to emphasize 
the sensitivity of the M-M paradigm to market imperfections and 
the role of these in constraining firms’ access to funds, e.g., 
Stiglitz and Weiss (AER, 1981), Greenwood et al. (AER, 1984), 
Myers and Majluf (JFE, 1984).
 Empirical support provided by Fazzari et al. (BPEA, 1988)
- found that ‘more constrained’ firms had greater investment-cash 
flow sensitivity 
positi e elationship bet een in estment and cash flo  is  v r w v w
evidence of financing constraints.
And more…
 Other studies found similar results across a wide range of 
investment ‘types’, e.g., R&D, inventories, labour.
 Objection: Q not adequately controlling for investment 
opportunities.
- but ‘natural experiment’ studies found same results when cash 
flow shocks clearly independent of investment opportunities, e.g., 
Lamont (JF, 1997), Blanchard et al. (JFE, 1994), Froot and 
O’Connell (NBER, 1997).
The great debate
 Kaplan and Zingales (QJE  1997),
- no theoretical reason for investment-cash flow sensitivity to 
monotonically increase in constraints;
FHP firms that are most constrained exhibit lower sensitivities than -
less constrained firms.
 Ensuing debate (FHP, QJE 2000; KZ, QJE 2000) centred on 
disagreements over
- theoretical conditions for monotoncity;
- appropriateness of KZ data sample (but see Cleary, JF 1999);
- definition of ‘financially constrained’. 
An uneasy truce
 Acceptance that the different findings of FHP and KZ at least partly 
reflect their different classification systems: frictions proxies versus 
financial strength indices.
 But not clear why. 
 Subsequent work has focussed on refining and clarifying this state of 
affairs.
- is the investment-cash flow relationship explained by financing 
i bl hi l i lconstra nts, or agency pro ems, or even somet ng e se ent re y 
(Microsoft conundrum)? 
Consolidation?
 Studies of theoretical underpinnings have tended to muddy the waters
- Alti (JF, 2003): can get FHP-type results in frictionless markets;
- Boyle & Guthrie (JF, 2003): can get KZ-type results in presence of a binding 
financing constraint.
 Cleary et al. (JFQA, 2007): U-shaped relationship between investment and cash 
flow.
 Bushman et al. (2007): sensitivity insignificant under alternative measure of 
cash flow.
 Chen & Chen (2009): investment-cash flow sensitivity has disappeared!
The way forward…
 Dynamic considerations - firm faces other constraints that may stop it 
using cash immediately.
Reverse causality and second order effects: the impact of investment  -
on cash flow.
- ordering of investment.
